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Summary
The Future Combat System (FCS) is the U.S. Army’s multiyear, multibillion-
dollar program at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts.  It is to be the
Army’s major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 18
manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and
information network.  FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-1
Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle with advanced,
networked combat systems.  The FCS program has been characterized by the Army
and others as a high- risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved as well
as the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-
equipped units can function as intended. 
The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which
could significantly influence the program’s outcome.  The wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and potential defense budget cuts could play a role in shaping the FCS
program.  The revised FCS program timeline — including four “Spin-Outs” whereby
equipment is to be tested first by a FCS evaluation brigade and then introduced into
the current force — has extended the program’s timeline by four years and has added
additional funding requirements, but it has also served to reduce some of the risk
associated with this admittedly high-risk venture. 
The overall FCS program budget has risen steadily since the program’s
inception and because the program is still in its early stages, its full costs are not yet
known. The FCS program is managed by a lead systems integrator group consisting
of major defense contractors Boeing and Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC). Although widely criticized, the Army adopted this program
management approach  because it maintains it did not have the required acquisition,
scientific, and engineering staff to manage a program of this complexity and scope.
The program’s recent conversion from an Other Transaction Authority (OTA)
agreement to a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contract — in part due to
congressional pressure — raises concerns regarding increasing  program costs as well
as the Army’s ability to take on a larger role in overseeing and executing this highly
complex and technologically risky program.
The FCS is experiencing a number of program development issues - with some
technologies advancing quicker than anticipated, others progressing along predicted
lines, while still others not meeting the Army’s expectations.   Congress, in its
authorization, appropriation, and oversight roles may wish to review the FCS
program in terms of its capabilities and program costs.   This report will be updated
as the situation warrants.   
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The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):
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Issues for Congress
The Future Combat System (FCS) is the Army’s multiyear, multibillion-dollar
program which is considered to be at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts.
It is to be the Army’s major research, development, and acquisition program for the
foreseeable future and is to consist of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied
together by an extensive communications and information network.  FCS is intended
to replace such current systems as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry
fighting vehicle with advanced networked combat systems. The FCS program has
been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture due to the advanced
technologies involved as well as the challenge of networking all of the FCS
subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units can function as intended. The
Army’s success criteria for FCS is that it should be “as good as or better than” the
Army’s current force in terms of “lethality, survivability, responsiveness and
sustainability.”1 
The primary issues presented to Congress are the capabilities  and affordability
of the FCS program and the likelihood, given a myriad of factors, that the Army will
be able to field its first FCS-equipped brigade by 2014 and eventually field up to 15
FCS-equipped brigades. Key oversight questions for consideration include: 
! What are the potential FCS capabilities shortfalls given program
progress to date and what are the ramifications for the future of the
program ? 
! What are the Army’s plans for FCS, should the program become
cost-constrained during the latter stages of development ?
Congress’s decisions on these and other related issues could have significant
implications for U.S. national security, Army funding requirements, and future
congressional oversight activities. This report will address a variety of issues
including the program’s timeline, budget, program systems and subsystems, as well
as current program developmental progress,  issues,  and challenges.
CRS-2
2 Many experts consider the Army’s 1999 controversial Task Force (TF) Hawk deployment
to Kosovo and Albania as the event that triggered the Army’s transformation. Reportedly,
the Army deployed a unit consisting of units from different divisions that had never trained
together commanded by a command and control organization that was unable to conduct
joint operations. The most often cited criticism was that it took  more than 30 days to deploy
TF Hawk, centered on 28 Apache attack helicopters, from bases in Germany to Albania;
and, when they finally arrived, they were unable to conduct combat operations due to
training and equipment deficiencies. The task force also consisted of mechanized maneuver
and support elements competing for limited air lift insertion capabilities.
3 According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States
Army,” dated June 14, 1994, a brigade consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers and
a division consists of approximately 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers.
4 Frank Tiboni, “Army’s Future Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation,” Federal
Computer Week, Feb. 9, 2004.
5 James Jay Carafano, “The Army Goes Rolling Along: New Service Transformation
Agenda Suggests Promise and Problems,” Heritage Foundation, Feb. 23, 2004, p. 5. 
6 Bruce R. Nardulli and Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army: Toward the Objective Force,”
in Hans Binnendijk, ed. Transforming America’s Military, (National Defense University
Press, 2002), p. 106.  




In October 1999, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki
introduced the Army’s transformation strategy which was intended to convert all of
the Army’s divisions (called Legacy Forces) into new organizations called the
Objective Force.2  General Shinseki’s intent was to make the Army lighter, more
modular, and — most importantly — more deployable. General Shinseki’s
deployment goals were to deploy a brigade3 in 4 days, a division in 5 days, and five
divisions in 30 days.4  As part of this transformation, the Army adopted the Future
Combat System (FCS) as a major acquisition program to equip the Objective Force.5
This transformation, due to its complexity and uncertainty, was scheduled to
take place over the course of three decades, with the first FCS-equipped objective
force unit reportedly becoming operational in 2011 and the entire force transformed
by 2032.6  In order to mitigate the risk associated with the Objective Force and to
address the near-term need for more deployable and capable units, the Army’s
transformation plan called for the development of brigade-sized units called the
Interim Force in both the active Army and the Army National Guard.  These seven
brigade sized units,7 known as both Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) or
CRS-3
8  The Stryker is the Army’s name for the family of wheeled armored vehicles which will
constitute most of the brigade’s combat and combat support vehicles.
9 Annex A (modular Conversion) to Army Campaign Plan, Change 2, September 30, 2005,
p. A-1. 
10 The following description of the early stages of the FCS program is taken from Frank
Tiboni’s Army’s Future Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation.
11 The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the Defense Department’s senior-level forum
for advising the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)) on critical decisions concerning DAB-managed programs and special interest
programs.
12 James Jay Carafano, p. 6.
13 Ibid.
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams8 (SBCTs), are currently being fielded and some have
served  in Iraq — with the last brigade due to be  fielded in 2007.9 
General Shinseki’s vision for the FCS was that it would consist of smaller and
lighter ground and air vehicles — manned, unmanned, and robotic — and would
employ advanced offensive, defensive, and communications/information systems to
“outsmart and outmaneuver heavier enemy forces on the battlefield.”10  In order to
initiate the FCS program, General Shinseki turned to the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), not only because of their proven ability to manage highly
conceptual and scientifically challenging projects, but also because he reportedly felt
that he would receive a great deal of opposition from senior Army leaders who
advocated heavier and more powerful vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the
M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.  In May 2000, DARPA awarded four contracts
to four industry teams to develop FCS designs and in March 2002, the Army chose
Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to serve as the
lead systems integrators to oversee the development and eventual production of the
FCS’ 18 systems.  On May 14, 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board11 (DAB)
approved the FCS’ next acquisition phase and in August 2004 Boeing and SAIC
awarded contracts to 21 companies to design and build its various platforms and
hardware and software.
Recent Activities
In August 2003, the newly designated CSA, General Peter Schoomaker, changed
the Army’s transformation plan.  General Schoomaker redesignated the Objective
Force as the Future Force, emphasizing the fielding of useful FCS program
capabilities as soon as they became available instead of waiting a decade or more
before they could be integrated into other FCS platforms and technologies under
development.12  Under General Schoomaker’s plan, the Army  restructured the FCS
program to place the emphasis more on the various networks linking Army forces
together, as well as with units from the other services, than on the actual FCS
platforms themselves.13
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14 United States General Accounting Office (GAO) (now called the Government
Accountability Office), “The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, Risks, and
Alternatives,” GAO-04-635-T, April 1, 2004.
15 Ibid., p. 1.
16  Other Transactions Authority (OTA) was established by Congress under Section 845 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 (10 U.S.C. Section 2371) for research,
development, and prototyping, and was intended to permit the government to more readily
interact with innovative companies who are not part of the traditional defense contracting
community.  OTA provides the government with the flexibility  to negotiate tailored
contracts that are not governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  As originally
enacted, OTA was intended for  companies that may not have the staff or resources to
operate under the FAR which has numerous administrative and reporting requirements that
may be beyond the capability of smaller companies.
17 Under Army supervision, Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC) operate as the FCS program’s “lead systems integrators” whereby Boeing and SAIC
act as the FCS prime contractor and allocate program developmental work through hundreds
of subcontracts to both large and small defense contractors.
18 Jen DiMascio, “Pentagon IG Investigates Acquisition Strategies:McCain Questions FCS
Commercial-Item Procurement Strategy,” Inside the Army, Vol.17, No.9, March 7, 2005;
Renae Merle, “Hearings to Focus on $100 Billion Army Plan,” Washington Post, March 15,
2005; Jonathan Karp and Andy Pasztor, “Army Program Run by Boeing Faces Challenge
by Sen.McCain,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2005; Scott Nance, “McCain Proposes
Procurement Study, Possible Reform,” Defense Today, Volume 26, Number 51, March 17,
2005; Renae Merle, “McCain, Auditors Question Army Modernization Effort,” Washington
Post, March 17, 2005.    
19 Scott Nance, “FCS Official: Spin-Outs to Bring Contractors More Work,” Defense Today,
Volume 26, Number 199, October 18, 2005, pp. 1-3.
The FCS program has received a great deal of scrutiny from both governmental
and non-governmental organizations and a number of changes to the program have
resulted in part from recommendations from these organizations as well as changes
initiated by Army and DOD leadership. An April 2004 report by the General
Accounting Office (GAO)14 noted that the FCS was at significant risk for not
delivering required capability within budgeted resources, primarily due to the
immaturity of a significant number of key FCS technologies.15  In addition to
significant risk, the FCS program was widely criticized for employing an Other
Transactions Authority (OTA)16 arrangement  to administer the program.  Much of
this criticism came from Congress, which was concerned that the OTA did not afford
the government the protection that standard contracts provided, gave too much
authority to the lead system integrator17 team of Boeing and Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC), did not provide sufficient opportunities for
oversight, and did not have the type of strict cost accountability mechanisms found
in traditional contracts.18 
The Army addressed these and other concerns by modifying the FCS program.
The Army now plans to “Spin-Out” selected technologies starting in 2008 to an
evaluation brigade that will test the technologies and those technologies deemed
“ready and relevant” will then be fielded to operational units.19  The intent is to take
the lessons learned from testing and experimentation and roll them back into the FCS
CRS-5
20 Ibid. 
21 Scott Nance, “FCS to Award Active-Protection System Pact,” Defense Today, Volume 26,
Number 191, October 5, 2005, p. 3.
22 “Review: FCS Meets Objectives, Moves Forward,” Defense Today, August 17, 2005, p.
3.
23 Ibid.
program to reduce developmental risk for the entire FCS brigade combat team.20 The
Army intends to conduct additional technology spin-outs in 2010, 2012, and 2014.
 In 2005, the Army moved the FCS program from the OTA arrangement to Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-based traditional contract that took affect on
September 23, 2005.21 
In August 2005, the FCS program reportedly successfully completed a Systems
of Systems Functional Review (SOSFR), an in-house technical review to ensure that
the program’s design and functional baselines are mature enough for the FCS
program to move into the Preliminary Design Phase of the program, currently
scheduled to begin in 2008.22 According to reports, the next major program
milestone will be the Initial Preliminary Design Review, expected some time in
2006.23
FCS and the National Security Environment
The FCS, like all other major, multiyear defense programs, is subject to the
changing demands of the national security environment.  No matter how successful
the FCS is on a programmatic level, whether or not the Army eventually achieves its
15-brigade FCS force is highly dependent on the influences of the current and future
national security environment. 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006.  The QDR is the
Administration’s statement on defense strategy, programs, and spending and is
published every four years and submitted to Congress no later than the date on which
the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress. The Defense
Authorization Act for FY1997 (P.L. 105-85) established the QDR, but only as a one
time requirement.  Congress established the QDR as a permanent recurring
requirement (10 U.S. Code, 118) in the National Defense Authorization Act of
FY2000.  The 2006 QDR was released on February 6, 2006, and focused primarily
on long-term unconventional warfare, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and
stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
FCS and QDR 2006.   The Army and the FCS program emerged from the
QDR 2006 process on what was described as a “sound footing” in terms of
maintaining momentum with respect to both the FCS program and long-term
CRS-6
24 Scott Nance, “Budget Increases Offer Army an Opportunity,” Defense Today, Volume 27,
Number 28, February 10, 2006, p. 1. Also see CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular
Redesign: Issues for Congress, for a detailed examination of the Army’s restructuring
efforts.
25 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 43.
26 Jen DiMascio, “FCS on Cost and Schedule, But Road Ahead May Be “Harsh,” Official
Says,” Inside Defense, February 20, 2006.
27 Ibid.
28 Megan Scully, Christopher P. Cavas, Laura M. Colarusso, Jason Sherman, “Top Defense
Programs: How Secure are they as Pentagon Budgets Tighten?” Armed Forces Journal, Dec.
2004, p. 27.
29 Information in this section is from Greg Grant, “Iraq Reshapes U.S. Army Thinking,”
Defense News, August 29, 2005.
modernization into a modular force structure.24  QDR 2006 did not recommend any
changes to the FCS program and committed DOD to:
Incorporate FCS improvements into the modular force through a spiral
development effort that will introduce new technologies as they are
developed.25
While Army officials appeared satisfied with the outcome of QDR 2006 — asserting
that the program continued “on cost and on schedule” — some Army officials
suggested that  the “road ahead for FCS is very harsh and that lots of things
[developmental efforts] will have to happen very well.”26  Some are concerned,
despite  improvement in some of the 49 critical FCS technologies, that the risk
associated with immature technologies could result in considerable future growth in
program costs, which some currently estimate are close to $160 billion.27 
The Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In 1999, a peacetime Army introduced
the FCS program as the centerpiece of its transformation plan. At that time, the Army
reportedly planned on “a few more years of relative tranquility to pay for the FCS”28
Most agree that the wars in Afghanistan and, particularly, Iraq have significantly
altered this expectation, resulting in not only a shift of the Army’s focus to dealing
with the day-to-day challenges of fighting a multi-front war, but also a total
restructuring of the Army’s combat forces, attempting to recruit and retain soldiers,
and repair and replace damaged, destroyed, and worn-out equipment.  
War “Lessons Learned” and FCS.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
provided the Army with a number of “lessons learned” and some suggest that these
conflicts will have a significant impact on reshaping how future senior leaders will
train and equip the Army.29 Army leadership (1) suggests that operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have reinforced the criticality of unmanned systems to increase soldier
survivability; (2) improved  mine detection capabilities to counter improvised
explosive devices; (3) active protection systems to counter a variety of threats
including rocket propelled grenades; (4) reconnaissance at all levels; (5) and an
CRS-7
30 Discussions with Army G-8 Staff, April 13, 2006.
31 Greg Grant, “Network Centric Blind Spot,” Defense News, September 12, 2005.
32 Information in this section is taken from Scott Nance, “Army Leaders: FCS Will Meet
Spectrum of Army Needs,” Defense Today, Volume 26, Number 188, September 30, 2005.
integrated network down to platoon level.30 These capabilities are included as central
requirements throughout  the FCS program.  
According to one defense analyst, operations in Iraq,  in particular,  have
produced “two leading schools of thought within the Army, divided by their visions
of the future world.”  The first school of thought reportedly believes that the current
counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq is not broadly representative of future conflicts
and that the Army must remained focused on fighting large, conventional wars and
that FCS will be a crucial part of this capability. The second school contends that
“large state-on-state conflicts are a thing of the past, and that irregular fighting in Iraq
is the future of warfare.”  Supporters of this view suggest that it is difficult to find
another military “that is building another Republican Guard or major tank army to
take on the American Army,” and that terrorism and insurgencies are more likely
future scenarios where, they contend, FCS would play a lesser role.
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Hurricane Katrina and the Need for
FCS Capabilities. While the Army’s current and future leadership will likely
continue to debate the nature of future conflicts, reports suggest that experiences
from Operation  Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Hurricane Katrina have demonstrated a
need for FCS capabilities. One report from OIF, describing an April 2, 2003, battle
between a single 500-man U.S. armor battalion and 8,000 Iraqi troops and 70 tanks
and armored personnel carriers, asserts that this sizeable Iraqi force was largely
concealed from current U.S. sensors through simple low-technology camouflage
techniques.31  Analysis of this battle, including interviews with participants, suggests
that Army forces on the ground were almost totally unaware of the size, composition,
and location of opposing Iraqi forces primarily because the U.S. Army’s speed of
advance was so rapid  that frontline units “outran” their intelligence. The report
further contends that while U.S. commanders in Kuwait had a good picture of the
enemy, “good intelligence was virtually non-existent among front-line units.” In
order for these units to get an intelligence update on opposing enemy forces, U.S.
units would have to stop their advance, set up a number of antennas, and attempt to
connect to the Army’s Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) network — a process
that could take hours. Furthermore, when units connected to the MSE network, the
bit transfer rate was so slow, that it would take additional hours to download data. In
addition to network connectivity problems, the report suggested that there were not
enough sensors to cover the battle area. Army officials who have studied  this battle
and its  associated reports contend that “FCS is designed to prevent a repeat of that
battle and will provide a significantly better information network.”  
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Army cited the benefits of an FCS-
equipped  force in disaster recovery operations.32  Army officials suggest that a
Katrina-like response mission “would benefit from the increased intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance as well as enhanced vertical-lift capabilities that
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FCS platforms will bring.” FCS unmanned vehicles  reportedly would be able to
enter buildings and negotiate complex urban terrain to locate people and FCS
unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) could also assist in recovery operations,




The Army describes FCS as a joint (involving the other services) networked
“system of systems.” FCS systems are to be connected by means of an advanced
network architecture that would permit connectivity with other services, situational
awareness and understanding, and synchronized operations that are currently
unachievable by Army combat forces.  FCS is intended to network with existing
forces, systems currently in development, and systems that will be developed in the
future. The FCS is to be incorporated into the Army’s brigade-sized modular force
structure.
FCS would include the following:
! Unattended ground sensors (UGS);
! Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) and Intelligent
Munitions System (IMS);
! Four classes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which will be
organic to platoon, company, battalion,34 and other echelons;
! Three classes of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs): the Armed
Robotic Vehicle (ARV), the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(SUGV), and the Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment
Vehicle (MULE);
! Eight types of manned ground vehicles;
! The network; and
! The individual soldier and his personal equipment and weapons.
The FCS is to serve as the core building block of the Army’s Future Force. FCS-
equipped brigade combat teams (BCTs) are to consist of:
! Three FCS-equipped Combined Arms battalions (CABs); 
! One Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon battalion;
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! One Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
squadron;
! One Forward Support battalion (FSB);
! One Brigade Intelligence and Communications company (BICC);
and
! One Headquarters company.
For a more detailed description of FCS subsystems, see Appendix A. 
FCS Program Timeline
FCS is currently in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase
of the Defense Acquisition System Life Cycle. The SDD phase is the third life cycle
phase which focuses on reducing integration and manufacturing risk, ensuring
operational supportability, and demonstrating the system through prototypes or
engineering development models.35  FCS entered the SDD phase in May 2003 despite
GAO warnings that the program was entering the phase with “more risk than
recommended by best practices or DOD guidance.”36 
On July 21, 2004, the Army announced a major restructuring of the FCS
program.  The primary objectives of the restructuring included
! Fielding FCS technologies to the current force in four discrete
“spirals’ starting in FY2008;
! Address Congressional language on the Non Line of Sight Cannon
(NLOS-C);37 
! Field all 18 systems (only 14 were funded under previous program);
! Lengthen schedule by four years; and
! Designate an evaluation brigade to test spiraled FCS capabilities.
Restructured Program.  At present, the FCS program is operating under the
schedule depicted below:
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Restructured FCS Program Schedule
Event Date (FY) Event description
Milestone B Update May 2005 Milestone B approves entry into System
Development and Demonstration Phase (SDD).
Preliminary Design
Review
2008 A technical review to evaluate the progress and
technical adequacy of each major program item.
It also examines compatibility with performance




2010 A technical review to determine if the detailed
design satisfies performance and engineering
requirements.  Also determines compatibility
between equipment, computers, and personnel.
Assesses producibility and program risk areas.
(Part of SDD Phase).
Design Readiness
Review
2011 Evaluates design maturity, based on the number
of successfully completed system and subsystem
design reviews.  (Part of SDD Phase).
Milestone C 2012 Milestone C approves the program’s entry into
the Production and Deployment (P&D) Phase.
The P&D Phase consists of two efforts — Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate
Production and Deployment (FRP&D). The
purpose of the P&D Phase is to achieve an




2015 IOC is defined as the first attainment of the
capability to employ the system as intended.
(Part of the P&D Phase).
Full Operational
Capability
2017 The full attainment of the capability to employ
the system, including a fully manned, equipped,
trained, and logistically supported force.  (Part
of the P&D Phase).
Note:  Event descriptions in this table are taken from the Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms
Glossary published by the Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 11th ed., Sept. 2003.
While GAO acknowledges that the restructured program is an improvement, it
still believes that the FCS program is “at significant risk for not delivering planned
capability within budgeted resources,” primarily due to the program’s technical
challenges and low level of demonstrated knowledge.38  One of GAO’s concerns is
that under the current program schedule, the actual performance of the completely
integrated FCS will be demonstrated very late in the program and could result a
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significant cost increase.  According to GAO, the Critical Design Review ideally
should occur in the FCS program in 2008 in order to “confirm that the design is
stable enough to build production representative prototypes for testing.”39  GAO
notes that the FCS Critical  Design Review instead occurs in 2010 which is only two
years before the Army decides on whether or not to enter into production and that the
Army does not expect to conduct a preliminary demonstration of all the elements of
FCS until sometime in 2013 — one year after the production decision.40 GAO
maintains that the Army’s current program schedule makes FCS susceptible to “late
cycle churn” whereby  problems discovered through testing late in a product’s
development cycle result in  significant investments in additional time, effort, and
funds to overcome the  problem — a phenomenon that GAO notes “is a fairly
common occurrence” in DOD programs.41
Lack of a Sound “Business Case” for FCS?  In March 2006 testimony
to the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) Subcommittee on Airland, GAO
testified that the FCS program still lacked the following elements of what is
described as a “sound business case” needed for FCS program success:
! Firm requirements;
! Mature technologies;
! Knowledge-based acquisition strategy;
! Realistic cost estimate; and
! Sufficient funding.42
Past GAO reports on FCS have also noted these alleged program deficiencies
and GAO has been extensively involved with the FCS program from the program’s
onset.  In particular, GAO suggests that the FCS program needs to address the afore-
mentioned deficiencies in order to be successful.
Firm Requirements.43  GAO acknowledges that the Army has made
significant progress in defining some of  FCS’s almost 11,500 program-level systems
of systems requirements but that, overall, system-level requirements are not yet
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say that it is almost certain that some FCS system-level requirements will have to be
either modified, reduced, or eliminated and that it would be at least 2008 before the
program reaches the point where it should have been at 2003 — when the program
started — in terms of stable requirements.  GAO’s concern is that based on historical
evidence, unstable requirements often lead to cost, schedule, and performance
shortfalls.
Mature Technologies.44  GAO notes that according to an April 2005
technology assessment readiness update  by the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology, that the “Army has not fully
matured any of the technologies critical to FCSs’ success.” GAO also contends that
several of the Army’s complementary programs - considered crucial in meeting FCS
requirements - are experiencing technical difficulties and some are not fully funded.
GAO continues to be concerned that some of FCS’s critical technologies may not
reach a demonstrated high level of maturity until the start of production which could
result in significant cost growth and delays.
Knowledge-Based Acquisition Strategy.45  GAO continues to express
concern that significant knowledge deficits for both requirements and technologies
continue to remain in the FCS program thereby creating an “enormous” challenge to
devise an acquisition strategy that can produce a mature design and production
process. Even if requirements establishment and technology maturity were at the
appropriate level, GAO believes that based on the current FCS program plan —
which has a number of late-occurring development and design reviews that are not
consistent with a best practices “knowledge-based” approach — that FCS design and
production maturity will not be demonstrated until after the production decision is
made. Of concern is that if design and production problems due to lack of maturity
do occur, production is the most expensive phase of the acquisition process in which
to fix these problems.
Realistic Cost Estimate.46   GAO now estimates that the total cost for the
FCS  program is at $160.7 billion (then year dollars47) — up 76% from the Army’s
first estimate. This estimate does not include FCS complementary programs needed
for  FCS technology “Spin- Outs” to the operational force. Taking these costs into
consideration, GAO estimates that FCS total costs are more on the order of $200
billion — with this figure likely to climb due to lack of a knowledge base and its
potential associated problems. In the Spring of 2006, the  DOD Cost Analysis
Improvement Group is reportedly scheduled to release an updated independent
estimate of the FCS program costs. 
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Sufficient Funding.48 Given the lack of a realistic cost estimate and current
Federal fiscal imbalances and pressure to decrease spending, GAO is concerned that
ultimately, the Army may not have sufficient funds to fully procure 15 FCS equipped
combat brigades.   Program affordability depends on the FCS program proceeding
without exceeding current projected costs; and having sufficient funding to meet FCS
procurement in FY2012 and 2013 which are currently beyond the Future Years
Defense Plan (FYDP). GAO suggests that if the Army does not have sufficient funds
in FY2012 and 2013 to meet FCS procurement requirements, the Army may need to
reduce the FCS procurement rate or delaying or reducing “Spin-Out” technologies.
If the FCS procurement rate is reduced, FCS unit costs could likely increase and
exacerbate an already difficult funding situation.
The FCS Program: A Sound Business Strategy.49 According to Army
officials the FCS program embodies  all the elements of a sound business strategy
and is being conducted in accordance with these principles.
Requirements Growth.  The Army contends that it has not added significant
requirements to the FCS program since the 2003 Operational Requirements
Document and has traded off what they term as “unrealistic requirements” to keep
the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase on cost and on schedule.
The Army further asserts that FCS systems-level requirements are planned, on
schedule, and will be stable before entering the program’s Initial Preliminary Design
Review later this summer.
Technological Maturity.  The Army suggests that there is a fundamental
disagreement between GAO and DOD on the level of technological maturation
required to support a knowledge-based acquisition approach. The Army contends that
DOD acquisition policy permits a lower Technology Readiness Level (TRL)50 for a
program or Milestone B start than GAO recommends. The Army maintains that
GAO’s higher TRL benchmark is based on commercial market practices and does not
meet DOD operating conditions or operational imperatives. While DOD’s technology
maturation approach does carry with it an element of risk, the Army believes that the
benefit of this approach is that it can develop a more advanced product quicker and
at a lower overall cost.
Cost Growth.  The Army maintains that GAO cost estimates are not accurate
because they aggregate the costs of other Army modernization programs (so-called
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complementary programs) without considering FCS program reorganization to
provide FCS technologies to operational units (Spin-Outs) which the Army contends
are the primary sources of cost growth in the program.  According to the Army, the
GAO estimate of $200 billion includes these complementary programs that were
never in the FCS program baseline budget. The Army further suggests that while
these complementary programs have a definite relationship to FCS, that even if the
FCS program were to be terminated, that these complementary programs would
continue as part of the Army’s overall modernization program.  Given this
relationship, the Army maintains that GAO’s $200 billion figure is an inaccurate
depiction, unless one wishes to aggregate most of the Army’s modernization
programs under the  FCS rubric. 
The Army’s View on the FCS Program’s Progress to Date.51  In their
testimony to the Senate, senior Army officials noted that despite all concerns, the
FCS program continues to move forward, successfully completing all SOSFRs and
beginning the transition into design and prototype development activities. The Army
suggested that 2006 was a crucial year for the program with a May 2006 Defense
Acquisition Board in-progress review and an August 2006 Interim Preliminary
Design Review scheduled.  The Army apparently does not share GAO’s concern
regarding maturity of key technologies and risk. According to the Army:
In terms of critical technologies, 18 of the 49 critical technologies are rated
with a Technical Readiness Level (TRL) of 6, one is rated 8. The program is
on schedule to have more than 23 rated TRL 6 by December 2006 and it is
on schedule to mature the rest by the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in
August 2008. Risk associated with the maturation of technologies was one
of the contributing factors in the Army’s decision to restructure the FCS
(Brigade Combat Team) program and extend it by four years. The current
program plan significantly reduces the degree of concurrency and risk
through both the spin-out plan and the increased development time between
Milestones B and C. The program’s maturity approach is consistent with
DOD acquisition policy.52
FCS Program Budget
The FCS program budget has risen steadily since 1999 as the program has
evolved.  According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Because the FCS
program is still in the early stages of development, its full costs are not yet known.”53
DOD has asked for $3.7 billion in FY2007 for FCS Research, Development, Testing
and Evaluation (RDT&E) and anticipates $22.4 billion RDT&E from FY2007-
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FY2011 (Future Years Defense Plan - FYDP).54 The Army’s 2005 reported position
was that FCS would cost from about $122 to $125 billion in constant dollars through
2025, with about $27.7 billion for RDT&E and $94 billion to equip 15 brigades.55
FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill Markup.  The House Armed Services
Committee (HASC), in its markup of H.R. 5122, The FY2007 Defense Authorization
Bill, recommended reducing the FCS program by $325 million — approximately 6%-
8% of the President’s $3.7 billion request — for “unjustified program cost increases
and excessive management reserve.”56  The HASC, while stating its support for FCS,
is concerned that spiraling FCS costs could make the FCS program unaffordable and
in the markup directed “a Defense Acquisition Board “go/no go” decision after
preliminary design review, not later than September 30, 2008.”57  
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), in its markup up of H.R. 5122,
authorized the full budget request for $3.7 billion, including $322.7 million for the
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System and $112.3 million for the Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon.58 The SASC markup also includes a legislative proposal requiring DOD to
submit an independent cost estimate of the core FCS program, FCS spin-outs, and
FCS complementary systems.59
FCS Budget Versus FCS Costs.   According to GAO, the current total
estimated cost for the FCS program is $160.7 billion (then year dollars) — an
increase of 76% over the Army’s first estimate.60 The Army — currently placing the
FCS total estimated cost at $161.4 billion — notes that this increase from the first
estimate is largely the result of restructuring the FCS program to address risk
concerns, adding four years to the program, the reintroduction of four FCS systems
that had been deferred, and the addition of “Spin-Outs” [previously called “spirals”
by the Army] where FCS technologies are evaluated and fielded to the operational
Army.61   In addition, the rate of FCS brigade production will be reduced from two
brigade combat teams (BCTs) per year to 1.5 BCTs per year which means that
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instead of completing all 15 FCS BCTs by 2020, it will take until 2025 to field all 15
BCTs.62
GAO asserts, however, that the $160.7 billion cost estimate does not include all
costs related to the FCS program, in particular
! Costs for the 52 essential complementary programs that are not
included in the FCS program, such as the Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) Clusters One and Five, which are expected to cost
about $32.6 billion (then year dollars);63
! Some complementary programs such as the Mid-Range Munition
and the Javelin Block II missile which are currently not fully funded;
and
! Procurement for the four FCS technology “Spin-Outs” to the current
Army forces is not yet entirely funded. Procuring these FCS items is
estimated to cost about $19 billion and installation kits needed to
support these technology “Spin-Outs” could cost an additional $4
billion.64
Even if the complementary programs are not included, the FCS program, as
currently structured, could cost $ 183.7 billion ($160.7 billion GAO estimate + $19
billion for Spin-Out procurement items + $4 billion for installation kits), which calls
into question the Army’s claim that FCS is a $161 billion program.  In addition to
reconciling this potential budget shortfall, two other issues that are somewhat outside
of the Army’s ability to control, defense budget cuts and rising personnel costs, may
have an impact on funds available for FCS in the future. 
Defense Budget Cuts.  In 2004, The Department of Defense (DOD) was
reportedly  asked by the Administration, as part of its deficit reduction campaign, to
reduce its spending plans over the next six years by $30 billion.65  Under DOD’s
Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753 released in December 2004, these cuts  fell
almost exclusively on Department of Defense, Navy, and Air Force programs
procurement programs.66 In December 2005, the Pentagon issued PBD 723, cutting
about $ 4 billion from the Army’s budgets between FY2006 and FY2011, with the
cuts focusing on reducing the size of the Army’s afloat pre-positioned brigade
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equipment sets.67  While it is unknown if PBD-based cuts will occur each fiscal year
for the duration of the FCS program, it would not be unreasonable to speculate that
while FCS has been spared these “11th hour DOD-directed cuts” thus far, that in the
future, FCS (particularly FCS-related programs experiencing difficulties) might be
targeted for cuts.
Rising Costs of Military Personnel.68 A number of reports suggest that the
rising costs of military personnel are competing with funds needed for modernization
programs, and that DOD and Army leadership reportedly would consider cutting
troop strength in order to protect funding for modernization programs. Defense
modernization programs “are costing more and taking longer to develop,” according
to GAO69, making the competition for funds even more acute.  Military pay and
benefits have reportedly risen 29% above inflation from 2000 and 2004, largely in
order to attract new recruits and retain service members.70  Some analysts believe that
these costs for the Army will climb even higher due to: 
! Enlistment and Re-enlistment Bonuses: Bonuses are reportedly
expected to increase from $31.3 million to a projected $ 44.3 million
in 2006;
! Allowances for Housing: Housing allowances have expanded from
$ 7.3 billion on 2000 to $12 billion in 2004 and are expected to rise
rapidly;
! Health Care Benefits: Increasing health care costs are considered a
significant contributor to increasing personnel costs. From 2000 to
2004, health care costs rose 69% — a figure that does not reflect
expansion of health care benefits for military retirees, reservists,
National Guard, and families; and
! Military Pay: DOD reportedly plans to increase military pay annually
by 3.5% through 2009 and combat zone tax benefits also serve as a
significant cost — a reported $6.4 billion in 2004.71
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While scaling back these benefits to the all-volunteer force and their families is
highly unlikely — particularly in wartime — DOD’s need to have adequate capital
to fund modernization may compel them to attempt to reduce personnel, given the
unlikelihood of receiving additional funds for modernization. The Air Force
reportedly plans to cut between 30,000 to 40,000 uniformed, civilian, and contractor
personnel between 2007 and 2011 — largely to protect funds needed for the next-
generation of combat aircraft.72  The Army was reportedly considering cutting a
number of  Army National Guard brigades and slowing active Army growth starting
in FY2007 in an effort to prevent cuts to FCS, 73 but widespread political opposition
from both Congress and governors74 might have caused the Army to abandon that
strategy. Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey subsequently pledged to fully fund
the National Guard to its 333,000-soldier end-strength, despite the Guard finishing
FY2005 17,00 soldiers below its end-strength.75 Given likely political opposition to
future proposed personnel cuts, this course of action — trading force structure and
personnel for modernization — may no longer be a viable means to protect FCS
funding, suggesting instead that savings will need to be found elsewhere in the
Army’s budget.
 
Program Management and Risk Reduction
Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) and Restructured Contract.  The Army,
in recognition that it does not have the resources or expertise to manage the FCS
program, continues to employ the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) management
approach whereby defense contractors Boeing and Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC) serve as “prime contractors with increased responsibilities such
as involvement in development design and source selection of major system and
subsystem contractors.”76   Boeing’s role, in particular, involves systems engineering
functions, competitive selection of defense companies to develop initial systems, and
integrating and testing these systems. Boeing is also responsible for developing two
crucial technologies for the FCS network — the System-of-Systems Common
Operating Environment (SOSCOE) and the Warfighter-Machine Interface (WMI) —
as well as Cluster One of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).77   There is
concern, however, about Boeing being the LSI and also administering and overseeing
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SOSCOE, WMI, and JTRS — also Boeing-run programs. One study suggests that
this situation creates an “inherent tension” regarding Boeing’s roles that could lead
to conflicts of interest.78 GAO notes, however, that “thus far, the Army has been very
involved in the management of the program and in overseeing the LSI.”79 Other
analysts suggest that Boeing has done an “amazing job of managing the development
of FCS”80 and the Army contends that by managing the FCS program with a LSI-
Army “one team” approach, that:
! There is one integrated management team versus 19 separate
program teams;
! There is a 30% reduction in the estimated development to fielding
timeline; 
! A 37% cost savings now due to collaborative large-scale, systems of
systems integration of FCS elements; and
!  Reduced life cycle costs in excess of 50%, largely due to cross
systems commonality that would be difficult to achieve with 19
separate programs.81
Since September 2005, the FCS program has been operating under a standard
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contract which the Army hopes to finalize in
March 2006.82 This new contract is expected to include standard FAR clauses such
as Truth in Negotiations, procurement integrity, and cost accounting standards and
the Army reportedly expects that the program content, such as the statement of work,
will remain unchanged and that “cost, schedule, and performance of the overall
development effort’ will not change materially.83  
The new FAR-based contract will reportedly revise the LSI’s management fee
plan, aligning it more closely to management performance.84 Under the OTA
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agreement, Boeing’s reported  base fee was 10% of the $21 billion FCS management
contract and a 5% incentive bonus. Under the new FAR-based contract, Boeing is
scheduled to receive a 3% base fee and a 12% incentive bonus — which some
contend will make Boeing more accountable for program performance. Others,
however, note that DOD has historically “paid billions in award and incentive fees
regardless of acquisition outcomes,”85 and doubt that such a proposed fee
restructuring will have discernable impact on improving accountability and
performance.
There are additional concerns about this new contract and fee structure — both
of which reportedly have not yet been finalized.  While the Army suggests that the
cost of changing to a FAR-based contract would be minimal, reports suggest that the
costs of changing the contract could range from $25 million to $75 million and, while
not a substantial amount in a $160 billion-plus contract, could raise further concerns
about the program’s overall affordability.86  There might also be additional costs that
have yet to be determined,  as one Pentagon official has suggested that the Army did
“little or no analysis before deciding to restructure the contract.”87 Under the new
FAR-based contract, the Army will reportedly exercise more oversight and will
assume more of the system management functions previously assigned to Boeing.
Some analysts, however, question how the Army will manage more aspects of the
FCS program when the original rationale used for selecting the LSI approach was that
the Army did not have the resources or expertise to manage such a complex
program.88 One defense expert suggests that “the government is not competent to
manage a program of this complexity,”89 which could lead to a potential situation
where the new FAR-based contract and increased Army participation in the program
management process could result in a less efficient and perhaps more costly program
than under the original OTA and management arrangement.
Risk Reduction.  The Army has taken a number of initiatives to reduce the
overall risk associated with the FCS program. Two particular initiatives are “spinning
-out” technologies to operational forces and the establishment of an experimental unit
to test those technologies. 
“Spin-Outs”.  The Army’s FCS program consists of four “spin-outs”, formerly
known as spirals, that will introduce FCS technologies and systems to the current
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force.  These fielding spin-outs are slated to occur in 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 to
an experimental brigade and then two years later to the rest of the Army. The first
spin-out of FCS technology in 2008 is to emphasize improved munitions and sensors
connected in an initial version of the FCS Network. These  network capabilities are
thought to include Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Clusters One and Five and the
Wideband Networking Waveform. In Spin-Out One, JTRS Clusters One and Five
would be used in conjunction with other FCS systems such as Unattended Ground
Sensors (UGS), the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS), and the pre-production
model of the Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C). Details for Spin-Outs Two
through Four are less well-defined. Reportedly, if Spin-Out One is successful, the
Army will add additional sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the
current force.90 Spin-Out Three, scheduled for 2012, would add the manned ground
vehicles (MGVs) to the current force and 2014’s Spin-Out Four would deploy the
FCS Network to the force.91
The Army’s goals for the spin-outs are to address the recommendations of a
number of reviews, such as GAO’s, to reduce overall developmental risk and also to
“get more capabilities into the hands of the warfighters sooner.”92 Of concern,
however is that procurements needed to equip the Spin-Outs are not entirely funded.93
These unfunded requirements would likely have to compete with other unfunded
programs in an increasingly  fiscally-constrained environment.
Experimentation.  The Army is reportedly in the midst of its first major field
test of FCS technologies. Referred to as Experiment 1.1, the Army was to have first
conducted a field exercise in October 2005, using modified High Mobility Multi-
Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvees) as surrogates for yet-to-be developed FCS
manned ground vehicles.94 These surrogate vehicles would be used to test early
versions of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), System-of-Systems Common
Operating Environment (SOSCOE) and elements of battle command software.  The
Army reportedly also planned to test early prototypes of the Unattended Ground
Sensor (UGS), an early prototype launch system for the Intelligent Munitions System
(IMS) and possible early versions of selected unmanned ground and aerial vehicles.
These 2005 field tests were then to be followed by a series of experiments in 2006
to be conducted in the program’s systems of systems integration lab. Little is
publically known about the exact scope of Experiment 1.1 or its results to date but
analysts suggest that lessons learned and the results of Experiment 1.1 could prove
to be valuable tools not only for risk mitigation but also in terms of judging the
feasibility of the FCS network’s intended capabilities.
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The Army has designated a combat unit to test FCS “spin-out” technologies
before they are fielded to operational forces.95 The Evaluation Brigade Combat Team
(EBCT) is scheduled to begin forming at Fort Bliss, Texas in March 2007 and is
expected to grow from 819 to 3,500 soldiers by 2008 when Spin-Out One equipment
is expected to arrive at the unit for testing. The Army plans on using the EBCT to test
FCS equipment until 2016 and then the brigade will transition to the Army’s first
fully FCS-equipped brigade combat team. Test results and user feedback from the
EBCT are expected to be used to further develop FCS equipment.  
Program Developmental Issues
The FCS program is comprised of a myriad of programs, each progressing in its
own unique manner. Some programs are exceeding or meeting expectation, while
others are experiencing significant difficulties.  Some of the more notable ongoing
programs are examined in the following sections. 
 
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)96
 JTRS  radios are software-defined radios that are to be used to provide voice,
video, and data communications to ground and aerial vehicles.  One of the primary
benefits of JTRS is that it is being designed so that it can operate on multiple radio
frequencies, permitting it to talk to certain non-JTRS radios that are expected to stay
in the Army’s inventory.  JTRS is a joint program and therefore  not considered part
of the FCS program by the Army but it is to form the “backbone” of the FCS
Network and therefore it never the less is of critical importance to the program’s
success. Two JTRS sub-programs managed by the Army —  Cluster One and Cluster
Five — have experienced developmental difficulties,  delays, and cost overruns
which called into question their viability. The Cluster One radio is intended for
ground vehicles and helicopters and is being developed by Boeing, and the Cluster
Five variant, includes handheld, manpack, and smaller versions for use in missiles,
sensors, and unmanned vehicles,  is being developed by General Dynamics.97
Program Reorganization.  The Department of Defense is reportedly in the
process of reorganizing the JTRS program by eliminating the previous system of
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“clusters” and splitting future funding equally among the Services.98 Under this plan,
Clusters One and Five will be combined into the “JTRS Ground Services Domain”
with Cluster One now being referred to as the “Ground Mobile Radio” and Cluster
Five the “Handheld/Manpack/Small Form Fit  (HMS) Radio - with the aerial version
of Cluster One being replaced by the JTRS Air Maritime Fixed (AMF) radio which
suggests that Boeing will no longer be involved in developing an airborne version of
the former Cluster One radio. In addition, DOD reportedly plans to establish a Joint
Waveform Program Office to manage and oversee the JTRS waveform program.99
Reduced Program Scope.  It also appears that the scope, and perhaps the
functionality of JTRS, might be reduced as a result of this program reorganization.
The new program will refocus on developing an “increment one” radio combining the
successful aspects of Boeing’s and General Dynamic’s previous work.100 Under this
plan, Boeing will focus developmental efforts on the Wideband Networking
Waveform and General Dynamics plans to focus on the Soldier Waveform, with each
contractor also ensuring that their respective radios are compatible with the Army’s
older SINCGARS and EPLRS radios.101  In addition, the Ground Mobile Radio
(formerly Cluster One) will only develop 6 or 7 waveforms as opposed to 32
waveforms under the old program.102 Also reduced in scope are the number of
channels for this radio — down to four channels from the original six to eight
channels envisioned by Army planners.103 While a reduced scope may be beneficial
to a struggling program that, in addition to technical difficulties, has also reportedly
suffered from additional requirements levied from DOD for functionality and shorter
timelines, some question what capabilities are being “given up” under this newly-
reorganized program and how this will affect the overall FCS program. 
Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T)  
WIN-T is described as the Army’s “communications network of the future
consisting of a three-tiered architecture of orbital, airborne, and ground links that will
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provide connectivity to a dispersed and highly mobile force.”104  Reports suggest that
developmental work on WIN-T has been relatively successful to date. Testing in
November 2005 of the current WIN-T network “proved that WIN-T can provide high
capacity, wireless voice and data network access to commanders at all levels of the
force despite a very dynamic operating environment.”105 The Army reportedly was so
pleased with the WIN-T test results that it plans to begin deploying WIN-T to
operational forces starting in 2007, far in advance of other FCS network
technologies.106  Even with overall program success, there are a number of significant
technological challenges associated with WIN-T, such as developing multi-functional
antennas.107 WIN-T, a program potentially worth $10 billion, is being developed
jointly by General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin, both of whom were originally
competitors for the WIN-T contract.
While WIN-T development is apparently exceeding expectations, the program
may potentially be rebaselined108, delayed, or even terminated, in part because the
WIN-T program overlaps with a similar program which is now being procured and
fielded to operational units.109 The other program, the Joint Network Node (JNN) built
by General Dynamics, was “rushed” to Army ground forces in 2004 to improve
tactical communications.110  JNN has improved satellite communications links, with
quicker network access and more bandwidth but is not mobile — something that the
Army hopes to achieve with the introduction of WIN-T and JTRS.111 The Army is
reportedly considering a variety of programmatic options including merging JNN and
WIN-T ahead of schedule, continue fielding  JNN, or spiraling in WIN-T into the
operational force over time. Of concern are the high costs of both programs,  the Army
could possibly spend up to $700 million from FY2006 - 2009 in  procurement dollars
for WIN-T.  JNN procurement funds ( $ 854 million in the FY2006 supplemental,
$340 million in the President’s FY2007 Budget Request, and $161.3 million in the
FY2006 bridge supplemental) could also be spent at the same time WIN-T is being
procured.112 Some critics suggest that the Army may be paying  twice for essentially
the same capabilities. 
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Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV)
MGV Transportability.  The MGV program is currently facing a major
technological challenge concerning its air transportability.  It has been widely reported
that one of the Army’s seven key performance parameters (KPP)113 for  MGVs is that
they be transportable by the Air Force’s C-130 transport aircraft.114  This is not the
case, however, as the Army notes that the MGV C-130 transport issue is not a KPP
but instead a Critical Operational Issue and Criteria (COIC) which is a far less
stringent requirement.115  That said, the MGV program continues to face significant
issues regarding C-130 transportability. In general, in order to meet this criteria, the
MGVs must weigh 19 tons or less (in accordance with the FCS Operational
Requirements Document) and be capable of driving into and fitting inside the C-130
to meet Air Force safety requirements, all while not exceeding C-130 operational
limits.116 
Reports suggest that, to date, the best that industry has been to do in terms of
MGV weight is more than 24 tons.117  In order to meet the C-130 weight limit, this
vehicle would need to be “stripped down” and it would require four to six hours per
vehicle to reconfigure them with fuel, ammunition, and other supplies — which is
significantly longer than the operational requirement that MGVs be converted to its
combat configuration no more than 30 minutes after rolling off a C-130.118  In
addition, a second C-130 aircraft would be required for each MGV to carry the
components and ammunition that had been stripped off the MGV so that it could meet
the 20 ton limit. 119  According to one Army official, this would “add hours to intra-
theater deployment times and tax the service’s logistics tail because it would
significantly increase the number of sorties to move the force.”120  If, instead, the Air
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Force’s C-17 transport is used for MGV transport, this process of “stripping” MGVs
would not be required.121
In 2005, the Army reportedly adopted a “24-ton design to weight requirement”
whereby the goal for the basic vehicle design was 19 tons, but allowed for the addition
of additional elements to the vehicles upon landing.122 The Pentagon’s Director of
Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E)123 in his 2005 Annual Report on DOD
Programs recommended that the Army:
Review the relevance of key requirements, particularly transportability of
manned ground vehicles. Design trades necessary to meet this requirement are
significant and have consequences in terms of operational effectiveness,
lethality, survivability, tactical mobility, and sustainability.124
Recently the Army has suggested that there has “been an evolution in thinking
in the Army on transportability,” moving away from the C-130 instead to the C-17 as
the preferred means of air transport for MGVs.125 The Secretary of the Army, Francis
Harvey, instead sees the C-130 as a design template, intended to “discipline engineers
and prime contractors to “think light” and “think mobile.”126 The Secretary of the
Army reportedly stated that the “real requirement is three FCS vehicles in a C-17.”127
Congressional Action.  In the Conference Report to the FY2006 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163), Congress called for the Secretary of
Defense to complete an independent analysis for congressional defense committees
on FCS key performance transportability requirements for manned ground vehicles.128
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The Committee further decided to “limit funds available” for manned ground vehicle
system development and demonstration (SDD) phase activities until the independent
report on MGV transportability was submitted to the defense committees. According
to Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) staff, as of April 19, 2006 this report,
which was due to Congress by February 1, 2006, has not yet been provided by the
Army.
MGV Engines.  In December 2004, the contract for the MGV engine was
delayed, marking  the fourth contract delay since requests for proposals (RFPs) were
first issued in October 2003.129  The decision to delay the contract was reportedly
based on the Army’s desire to increase engine power from a 410 kilowatt power rating
to a 440 kilowatt power rating in order to power heavier vehicles.130  In August 2005,
the Army awarded Detroit Diesel a reported $47 million SDD phase contract to
develop diesel engines for FCS MGVs.131 This contract calls for delivering 12  5L890
engines beginning in mid-2006 with an option for 35 additional engines.  The 5L890
reportedly can operate at the Army’s required 440 kilowatts  and could “easily” propel
a 20 to 25 ton vehicle, however anything heavier would require an upgraded engine.
Active Protection System (APS).132 In March 2006, the FCS LSI Team of
Boeing and SAIC reportedly awarded a contract potentially worth $70 million to
Raytheon to develop an Active Protection System (APS) for FCS as well as the
Army’s current fleet of vehicles.  The APS, divided into a short-range system for
dealing with urban-type threats such as rocket-propelled grenades and a long-range
system for dealing with anti-tank guided missiles, has been compared to a “mini anti-
ballistic missile system.” For both systems, a suite of sensors is intended to detect an
incoming threat and then hit the incoming projectile with projectile of its own. 
Raytheon was reportedly given 90 days under its contract to conduct trade studies
and then present the results to the Army and LSI, who will then decide on an APS
architecture for the current force and evaluate proposals for the direction of the system
destined for use on FCS vehicles. Initial work is expected to focus on the short-range
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threat as technology is further along than it is for the longer-ranged threats. The Army
and LSI will reportedly decide on the APS architecture for FCS vehicles in early 2007.
The $70 million contract is broken into three parts:  $10 million over the course of the
contract (2006 to 2011); a $30 million option for Raytheon to find current force
applications; and $30 million to provide APS to FCS. An early version of the short-
range APS is expected in 2007.
Safety Concerns.  There are a number of concerns about APS  - with safety
to friendly troops being at the forefront. As currently envisioned, APS will fire some
yet to be determined projectile in response to a sensor detecting an incoming threat
projectile, with the response time being almost instantaneous in some cases. There are
concerns that dismounted U.S. forces, allied forces, and possibly civilians,  in the
proximity of the APS could be killed or wounded. Another potential issue is that the
APS’s sensor arrays and kill mechanisms could put unacceptable power requirements
on current Army vehicles as well as FCS platforms.
Technological and Integration Challenges.  GAO suggests that there are
technological and integration challenges facing the APS program, asserting that:
! It may not be technologically possible to have a single, integrated
active protection system that protects against all threats;
!  The Threat Warning System, a proposed system that will detect and
track incoming threats at extended ranges, will not mature to TRL 6
standards until FY2009;
! The part of the system intended to defeat kinetic energy threats will
require a significant effort from the scientific and engineering
community; and
! Protection technology may have limited utility in urban environments
due to collateral effects.133
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)
In August 2005, BAE Systems was reportedly awarded a $122.3 million contract
modification to develop two armed robotic vehicle (ARV) variants for the FCS
program.134 This modification raises the value of BAE’s previous system development
and demonstration (SDD) contract from $189 million to $311.3 million and an
additional $9.2 million could possibly be added to the contract if additional task orders
are authorized. Under this modification ARV prototype development will be
accelerated, with the first prototypes to be fielded in 2010 and with production models
scheduled to be fielded to FCS-equipped brigade combat teams in the 2012-2014 time
CRS-29
135 Information in this section is from Scott Nance, “Funds Climb for FCS Robot Maker,”
Defense Today, Volume 26, Number 102, May 31, 2005, p. 3.
136 Information in this section, unless otherwise noted is from Government Accountability
Office (GAO) Report “Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case is Needed for Future
Combat System’s Successful Outcome,” GAO-06-367, March 2006. 
137 Ibid., p. 12.
138 Ibid., p. 2.
frame. The ARVs are intended to be the size of a large pick up truck and also highly
deployable — either two at a time on a C-130 aircraft or one on a CH-47 helicopter.
BAE Systems is also working with General Dynamics under a SDD contract to lead
the MGV developmental effort. 
Additional funding has also reportedly been provided to iRobot Corporation
(Burlington, Massachusetts) to develop the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(SUGV).135 The new funding — now $51.4 million up from a previous $37.3
million — is intended to expedite the development of the FCS SUGV. The FCS
SUGV will likely be a more compact version of iRobot’s PackBot - a man portable
reconnaissance and tactical robot which U.S. forces have used extensively in
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Issues for Congress
What if FCS Proves to be “Less Capable” than Originally
Envisioned?
The FCS program ultimately hopes to produce a futuristic combat unit of
unmatched capability in terms of lethality and survivability. But approximately one-
third of the way through the program, there is growing concern that FCS could be
significantly less capable than envisioned by the Army, which raises the question if
FCS will meet the Army’s “as good as or better than” criteria for the FCS program.
System Level Requirements.136  In a recent report on the FCS, GAO states
that “the Army anticipates that there could be roughly 90,000 systems-level
requirements for FCS.”137  According to GAO, the Army plans to “trade off systems
requirements to offset technical risks and costs,” but that there is limited flexibility to
this approach in order to meet program success criteria.138 While many systems
requirements are likely achievable, GAO suggests that would be “technical risk in the
full achievement of some system-level requirements including;”
! Mine detection;
! Automatic target recognition for terminal weapon guidance;
! Real-time battle damage assessment;
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! Chemical and radiation detection;
! Weapon self-loading for some unmanned ground vehicles;
! Manned ground vehicle countermine capabilities;
! Safe operation of unmanned ground vehicles;
! Network latency, quality of service, and intrusion detection;
! Improvised explosive device detection and suppression;
! Reliability, availability, maintainability, and testing;  
! Unmanned aerial vehicle size and weight; and
! Sensor data fusion.139
An examination of these potential capability shortfalls reveals that they are not
focused in one specific area of the program but, instead, run the gamut of capabilities.
In particular, manned ground vehicle survivability is called into question in terms of
potential “mine detection,” “countermine capabilities,” and improvised explosive
device (IED) detection and suppression” capability shortfalls.  While analysts suggest
that survivability, even among current armored fighting vehicles, is a significant
challenge —  with opponents such as in Iraq  constantly devising new ways to defeat
armored vehicles with mines and IEDs — these potential survivability shortfalls for
the weight-constrained FCS manned ground vehicles could mean a much lower
survival threshold for these vehicles than anticipated. 
Network Dependency.140  In its report GAO notes the criticality of the FCS
Network in achieving many of FCS’s requirements, suggesting that there is “hardly
any aspect of FCS functionality that is not predicated on the network.”141 While some
developmental aspects of the FCS network appear to be progressing in good order,
others are said to be experiencing difficulties. In particular, the JTRS program has
raised concerns as it appears to some to be in an almost constant state of
reorganization or on the verge of cancellation. Early JTRS versions delivered for
experimentation are reported to be able to accommodate fewer waveforms than
anticipated and can operate on fewer channels than ordinally envisioned. These and
other difficulties have led to the adoption of legacy radio systems - particularly for the
Army’s helicopter fleet. 
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With many more parts of the FCS Network still in varying stages of development
with a variety of possible outcomes in terms of success, partial success, or failure,
there appears to be a growing concern that the overall FCS Network - which will not
be fully-developed until almost the end of the FCS development cycle - may also be
less capable than originally envisioned.  One possible scenario which could have
significant implications would be a “17 Go and 1 No-Go “ scenario whereby 17 of the
FCS core systems are judged by the Army to meet its success criteria for development
and deployment but 1 core system - the FCS Network - falls significantly short of its
requirements, perhaps prompting the Army to accept a far less capable system.  Given
the FCS Networks “central nervous system” - role in FCS, such an outcome could
result in 17 state of the art combat systems not being employed to their full
technological and warfighting potential because the FCS Network cannot provide
them with the requisite command and control, communications, intelligence, sensory
data, tracking, and planning capabilities.   
Possible Congressional Interest. Congress may decide to examine, in
concert with the Department of Defense and the Army, the possibility that FCS may
develop into a less capable system than originally envisioned. Although still in the
development phase, progress in some areas has been characterized as less than
satisfactory and the Army has reportedly acknowledged that it would “trade off
systems requirements to offset technical risks and costs.” Congress might choose to
explore with the Pentagon which systems requirements are falling short of
expectations as well as what systems  requirements would be “traded off” by the Army
for risk and or cost considerations.
What if FCS Becomes “Cost-Prohibitive” Late in its
Development Cycle?142
The potential convergence of three factors in the later stages of the FCS program
could place the FCS program in a “cost-prohibitive” status, potentially forcing the
Army, the Department of Defense, and ultimately Congress into making some crucial
decisions about the future of the FCS program.
Factor One: FCS Acquisition Strategy.  GAO has repeatedly warned that
the FCS acquisition strategy lacks an adequate knowledge base, relies too heavily on
concurrent development, and does not demonstrate a sound business case. As
previously discussed, of critical concern is that under the current program schedule,
the actual performance of the completely integrated  FCS  will be demonstrated very
late in the program and could result a significant cost increase. This situation, referred
to as “late-cycle churn”  — a common occurrence in DOD programs — occurs when
significant problems are discovered late in a product’s development, resulting in
additional and unanticipated costs, time, and effort.  GAO suggests that “the late
accumulation of design and production knowledge called for by the FCS acquisition
strategy increases the likelihood that problems will be discovered in late development
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and early production.”143 In the event that the FCS program does fall victim to “late
cycle churn” GAO speculates that DOD might be hard pressed to accommodate this
situation “given the magnitude of its cost in an increasingly competitive environment
for investment funds.”144 
Factor Two: Potential Cost Increases.   Apart from unanticipated costs as
a result of late cycle churn, there are other potential additional costs which could push
the price tag for FCS higher than the current estimated $160 billion or $200 billion if
essential complementary programs are factored in. As previously discussed, GAO
believes that  the Army does not have sufficient funds in FY2012 and 2013 to meet
FCS procurement requirements and that there are also a number of program
requirements, including spiraling, that are not fully funded. As the program progresses
and becomes further defined, other additional costs will likely be identified. Examples
of potential additional costs are lightweight armor, vehicle survivability technologies,
and additional unmanned vehicles. 
Lightweight Armor and Survivability Technologies.  In order to meet
weight requirements for manned ground vehicles, the Army is considering the use of
advanced, lightweight materials, such as ceramics which could be significantly more
costly than current armor protection. Meeting manned ground vehicle survivability
requirements could also prove to be more costly than anticipated as each vehicle will
need to be equipped for “detection avoidance, target acquisition avoidance, hit
avoidance, ballistic protection, and kill avoidance,” as well as sensors to “detect,
classify, recognize, identify, and locate enemy combatants.”145 
Additional Unmanned Vehicles.  The FCS as depicted by the Army, will
depend to a large extent on unmanned ground and aerial vehicles (UGVs and UAVs)
to enhance the FCS brigade combat team’s survivability. It is expected that a large
number of these systems will be destroyed by enemy fire and will therefore need to
be replaced or risk the loss of even more costly manned ground vehicles. With 200
UAVs planned for each of the 15 brigades, UAV replacement costs alone could be
considerable. 
Factor Three: Constrained Resources and Competition for Funding.
Constrained resources and competition for funding, given the first two factors, could
potentially push the FCS into the “cost-prohibitive” category. The current budgetary
environment has been characterized by some as austere as the United States is facing
a large and growing deficit.  Recent Pentagon Program Budget Decisions levying
Service-wide cuts may continue in future years and could have implications for future
FCS funding. Within the Army itself, competition between rising personnel costs, as
well as increasing costs to repair and replace damaged or destroyed equipment, and
growing funding requirements for the Army’s modular force transformation, could put
the FCS program, even if it manages to hold down costs, into a cost-prohibitive status.
Unknown factors such as future major Global War on Terror operations, potential
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regional conflicts,  and possible disaster recovery expenses could further impact on
funds available for the FCS program.   
Options for an Under-Budgeted FCS Program.  It is not inconceivable
that the FCS program could  emerge from its development phase and face substantial
cost challenges from late-identified developmental problems as well as additional
costs accrued in developing systems that meet the Army’s lethality, transportability,
and survivability criteria.  Historically, in similar cases when only a single system was
involved, the Services could opt to extend the development timeline or reduce the
number of ships, aircraft, or tanks procured. Such  courses of action may not be viable
for FCS due to its system interdependencies. There might be some cost savings
associated with extending timelines or reducing the procurement from 15 brigades to
some lesser number of brigades, but there could be economy of scale costs or costs
associated with delaying procurement which could make the overall program even
more expensive.   In such a case, there may be little recourse other than paying
whatever the costs are to procure FCS.   However, given the current and potential
budgetary challenges, this  could have a detrimental impact on other Army or DOD
programs if DOD decides to fully fund FCS procurement at a higher than anticipated
cost. 
  Possible Congressional Interest. Congress might opt to examine how DOD
and the Army would respond to a situation where FCS program costs become
prohibitive late in its development cycle, assuming that significant additional funds
are not available to cover increased program costs. Would the Army opt to delay the
program or cancel a system or a family of systems in order to outfit 15 brigade combat
teams with remaining FCS technologies or instead field fewer than the 15 brigades
presently planned?  All courses of action carry operational considerations and trade
offs which could be of interest to Congress. If these courses of action are not
economically or operationally sound and assuming that additional funds for FCS are
not forthcoming,  what Army and/or DOD programs might be candidates for budget
reductions in order to fully fund FCS procurement?  
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Appendix A.  FCS Subsystems
Manned Ground Vehicles
FCS manned ground vehicles (MGVs) are a family of eight different combat
vehicles — with some having more than one variation — that are based on a common
platform and are being designed to be air transportable by the U.S. Air Force. They
are to be equipped with a variety of passive and active protection systems and sensors
that the Army hopes will offer them the same survivability as the current heavy armor
force.  In addition the Army intends for its MGVs to be highly reliable, require low
maintenance, and have fuel-efficient engines.  The following are brief descriptions of
MGV types and variants. All are intended to have a range of 750 kilometers and a top
speed of 90 kilometers per hour (kph) — 55 miles per hour:146
Mounted Combat System (MCS).  As envisioned, the MCS provides direct
and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) fires, is capable of providing direct fire support to
dismounted infantry, and can attack targets with BLOS fires out to a range of 8
kilometers. The MCS is intended to replace to current M-1 Abrams tank.  The MCS
is to have a crew of two and might also be able to accommodate two passengers.   The
MCS is to be armed with a 120 mm main gun, a .50 caliber machine gun, and a 40
mm automatic grenade launcher.
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV).  As planned, the ICV consists of four
versions: the Company Commander version, the Platoon Leader verison, the Rifle
Squad version, and the Weapons Squad version. All four versions appear to be
identical from the exterior to prevent the targeting of a specific carrier version. The
Rifle Squad version is to have a two man crew and is to be able to transport a nine
man infantry squad and dismount them so that they can conduct combat operations on
foot. The ICV is to mount a 30 or 40 mm cannon. 
Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C).  The NLOS-C is to provide
networked, extended-range targeting and precision attack of both point and area
targets with a wide variety of munitions.  Its primary purpose will be to provide
responsive fires to FCS Combined Arms Battalions and their subordinate units.  The
NLOS is to have a two man crew and  a fully automated handling, loading, and firing
capability.   
Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M).  The NLOS-M is intended to provide
indirect fires in support of FCS companies and platoons . The NLOS-M is to have a
four man crew, mount a 120mm mortar, and also carry an 81 mm mortar for
dismounted operations away from the carrier.   
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV).  As planned, the RSV
will feature advanced sensors to detect, locate, track, and identify targets from long
ranges under all climatic conditions, both day and night. The RSV is to have a mast-
mounted long-range, electro-optical infra-red sensor, sensors for radio frequency (RF)
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intercept and direction finding as well as a remote chemical warfare agent detector.
RSVs are to also carry four dismounted scouts, unattended ground sensors (UGS), a
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) with various payloads, and two Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In addition to the four scouts, the RSV is to have a two man
crew and a defensive weapons system. 
Command and Control Vehicle (C2V).  The C2V is intended to serve as the
“hub” for battlefield command and control.  It is to provide information management
for the integrated network of communications and sensors for the FCS brigade combat
teams. The C2V is to have a crew of two and carry four staff officers and also be
capable of employing UAVs. 
Medical Vehicle - Evacuation (MV-E) and Medical 
Vehicle - Treatment (MV-T).  There are to be two versions of the MV:  the MV-E
and MV-T. The MV-E would permit combat trauma specialists to be closer to the
casualty’s point of injury as it is to move with combat forces and evacuate casualties
to other treatment facilities.  The MV-T is to enhance the ability to provide Advanced
Trauma Management/Advanced Trauma Life Support forward in the battle area and
both MV-E and MV-T would be capable of conducting medical procedures and
treatments using telemedicine systems.  Both would have four man crews and the
capability to carry four patients.
FCS Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV).  The FRMV would be
the FCS Brigade Combat Team’s  recovery and maintenance system. The FRMV is
to have a crew of three, plus additional space for up to three recovered crew members.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)147
Each FCS-equipped brigade is to have almost 200 UAVs ranging from small,
platoon-level vehicles to larger, higher endurance aircraft.148  While these UAVs are
to provide a variety of capabilities to forces on the ground, some experts note that they
could also present an air space management challenge to not only manned Army
aviation assets, but also to Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and other nation’s aircraft
that might be providing support to Army ground operations.  The following are brief
descriptions of the Army’s four classes of UAVs:
Class I UAVs.  Class I UAVs are intended to provide Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) at the platoon level. Weighing less than
15 pounds each, these Class I UAVs are intended to operate in urban and jungle
terrain and have a vertical takeoff and landing capability.  They are to be used to
observe routes and targets and can provide limited communications transmissions
relay. The Class I UAV are to be controlled by dismounted soldiers and can also be
controlled by selected FCS ground platforms, and have an endurance of 50 minutes
over an 8 kilometer area, and a 10,500 foot maximum ceiling. 
CRS-37
149 Unless otherwise noted, information for these descriptions are taken from two Army
sources: The Army’s FCS 18+1+1 White Paper, dated Oct. 15, 2004 and the FCS 2005
Flipbook, dated Aug. 26, 2004.
Class II UAVs.  Class II UAVs are intended to provide RSTA at the company
level. The Class II UAV is to be vehicle mounted and have a vertical takeoff and
landing capability.  Its planned distinguishing capability is that it can designate targets
both day and night and in adverse weather at a distance of 2 kilometers from the UAV,
enabling the company commander to employ line-of-sight, BLOS, and NLOS fires.
It can also provide limited communications relays.  Class II UAVs are intended to
have an endurance of 120 minutes over a 16 kilometer area and an 11,000 foot
maximum ceiling. 
Class III UAVs.  Class III UAVs are to be multifunctional systems intended to
be employed at the  battalion level. A Class III UAV  encompasses all capabilities
found in the Class I and II UAVs and are planned to also provide an enhanced
communications relay capability, mine detection, chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear detection, and meteorological survey.  The Class III UAV is to be able to
take off and land without a dedicated airfield and is intended to be able to stay aloft
for 6 hours over a 40 kilometer area with a maximum ceiling of 12,000 feet.
Class IV UAVs.  Class IV UAVs are intended to provide the FCS brigade
commander with  a long endurance capability encompassing all functions in Class I
through Class III UAVs. It is intended to stay aloft for 72 continuous hours and
operate over a 75 kilometer radius with a maximum ceiling of 16,500 feet. It is also
planned to interface with other manned and unmanned aerial vehicles and be able to
take off and land without a dedicated airfield. 
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs)149
Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV).  The ARV is intended to come in two
variants — the Assault variant and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition (RSTA) variant.  The two variants are to share a common chassis. The
Assault variant is to provide remote reconnaissance capability, deploy sensors, and
employ its direct fire weapons and special munitions at targets such as buildings,
bunkers, and tunnels.  It is also intended to be able to conduct battle damage
assessments, act as a communications relay, and support both mounted and
dismounted forces with direct and anti-tank fire as well as occupy key terrain.  The
RSTA version is to have similar capabilities but is not intended to provide direct
support fire to mounted or dismounted troops.
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV).  The SUGV is a small,
lightweight, manportable UGV capable of operating in urban terrain, tunnels, and
caves. The SUGV will weigh 30 pounds, operate for 6 hours without a battery
recharge, and have a one kilometer ground range and a 200 meter tunnel range. Its
modular design will permit a variety of payloads which will enable it to perform high-
risk intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and chemical
weapons or toxic industrial chemical  reconnaissance.
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Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE).  The
MULE is a UGV that will support dismounted infantry. It is to come in three variants
sharing a common chassis - (transport, countermine, and the Armed Robotic Vehicle -
Assault - Light (ARV-A-L)).  The transport variant is to be able to carry 1,900 to
2,400 pounds of equipment and rucksacks for dismounted infantry and follow them
in complex and rough terrain. The countermine variant is to have the capability to
detect, mark, and neutralize anti-tank mines.  The ARV-A-L variant is to incorporate
a weapons package and a  RSTA package to support dismounted infantry operations.
The MULE is intended to have a 100 kilometer road, and 50 kilometer cross country,
range.
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)150
UGS are divided into two groups — Tactical UGS and Urban UGS — and are
described as follows:
Tactical UGS. Tactical UGS include intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) sensors.  These sensors are to employ a variety of sensing technologies and
integrated into the overall FCS network.  They are intended to be deployed by hand,
by vehicle, or by robot and have a 48 hour endurance.  They are intended to be
expendable, low-cost sensors  used for such tasks as perimeter defense, surveillance,
target acquisition, and CBRN early warning.
Urban UGS.  Urban UGS can also be employed by soldiers, vehicles, or robots
and are intended to provide situation awareness inside and outside of buildings for
force protection and also for previously-cleared buildings and areas.
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) and Intelligent
Munitions System (IMS).
NLOS-LS.  NLOS-LS is to consist of a family of missiles in a deployable,
platform-independent, container launch unit (CLU), which can be fired in an
unmanned and remote mode. Each CLU is to have a fire control system and 15
missiles consisting of Precision Attack Missiles (PAM) and Loitering Attack Missiles
(LAM).
The PAM is to have two employment modes — a direct-fire and a fast attack
mode or a boost-glide mode. The missile is intended to receive target information
prior to launch and  receive and respond to target location updates while in flight. The
PAM can be fired in the laser-designated mode and  transmit near real-time target
imagery prior to impact. The PAM is intended to be used against heavily armored
targets.
The LAM is to provide imagery for search, surveillance, targeting, and battle
damage assessment (BDA) and can also serve as an airborne radio retransmission
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sight. LAMs are to be capable of flying long distances with significant loiter times.
LAMs are intended to be re-programmed in flight and attack, high value, fleeting
targets. 
IMS.  IMS is intended to be an unattended munitions system, consisting of a
variety of lethal and non-lethal munitions and can be used for filling gaps, isolating
enemy forces or objectives, and controlling non-combatant movement with nonlethal
munitions. IMS is to have an on-off capability and can be recovered and re-employed
if not used. It can also self destruct if required and is to have an anti-tamper capability.
IMS is eventually intended to replace most current U.S. anti-personnel mines.
The Network151
The FCS network is considered the most crucial system of all 18 systems and,
according to the CSA, General Schoomaker, “the toughest part of the program will be
assembling the network that ties the system of systems together.”152  The FCS network
is to consist of four interactive components — the System-of-Systems Common
Operating Environment (SOSCOE); Battle Command (BC) software; communications
and computers (CC); and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) systems.
System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE). The
SOSCOE is to enable the integration of a variety of software packages into the FCS
network.  It is intended to use commercial, off-the-shelf hardware and allow for the
integration of critical interoperability packages that translate Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, and  allied message formats into internal FCS message formats. 
Battle Command (BC) Software.  Battle Command mission applications are
to include mission planning and preparation, situational understanding, battle
command and mission execution, and warfighter-machine interface.
Mission Planning and Preparation.  Consists of 16 different functions that
provide FCS units with the following automated capabilities:
! The development of deliberate, anticipatory, and rapid-response
plans;
! The ability to perform plan assessments and evaluations;
! The ability to perform terrain analysis;
! The conduct of mission rehearsals; and
! The conduct of after action reviews.
Situation Understanding.  This consists of 10 different packages that allow
the user to better comprehend their surroundings.  These packages employ map
information and a variety of databases that help to determine enemy locations and
capabilities, infer enemy intentions, and assess the threat to U.S. forces.
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Battle Command and Execution.  This package contains a variety of
planning and decision aids to help commanders make rapid, informed, and accurate
decisions during battle.  These packages can also be used in the training and rehearsal
modes.
Warfighter-Machine Interface Package.  This package receives soldier-
generated information and displays information across all FCS platforms for soldier
use. 
Communications and Computer (CC) Systems.  The Communications
and Computer network is intended to provide secure, reliable access to information
over extended distances and complex terrain. This network is not intended to rely on
a large and separate infrastructure because it is to be embedded in the FCS mobile
platforms and  move with the combat units. The communications network is to consist
of a variety of systems such as the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS); Wideband
Network Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform systems; Network Data Link; and
the Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN-T).
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) Systems.  The
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance System is to be a distributed and
networked array of multispectral ISR sensors intended to provide timely and accurate
situational awareness to the FCS force. In addition, the ISR system is intended to help
FCS formations avoid enemy fires while providing precision, networked fires to the
unit. 
The Soldier
All dismounted soldiers are to wear the Land Warrior combat ensemble, which
includes enhanced body protection, an embedded computer/communication system,
and a family of new personal weapons.
 
